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Abstract
Situations where a group of agents come together to jointly buy a resource that they individually
cannot afford to buy are commonly observed in markets. For example in the US market for radio
spectrum, a recent proposal invited small firms who would benefit from gaining additional access to
spectrum to jointly submit bids for blocks of spectrum with the idea that its utilization could be shared.
In such a scenario, the problem is to design a mechanism that truthfully elicits and aggregates the
privately held preferences of these agents, and enables them to act as a single decision-making body in
order to participate in the market. In this paper, we design a class of mechanisms called monotonic
aggregation mechanisms that achieves this under a specific setting. We assume that the resource is
being sold in a sealed-bid second-price auction that solicits bids for the entire resource. Our mechanism
truthfully elicits utility functions from the buyers, prescribes a joint bid, and prescribes a division of
the payment and the resource in the event that they win the resource in the auction. This mechanism
further satisfies a popular notion of collusion-resistance known as coalition-strategyproofness. We give
two explicit examples of this generic class for the case where the utility functions of the buyers are
non-decreasing and concave.
1 Introduction
Examples of resources that are produced and sold as discrete units on the supply side, but which could be
shared or be divided amongst buyers on the demand side are ubiquitous. For example there is a single fare to
be paid for a taxi-ride no matter how many people take it, but multiple people can potentially share this fare;
or an entire house can be rented for a fixed monthly payment that can be shared between roommates. There
are other examples like laboratories jointly purchasing an expensive scientific equipment for experimentation
or firms buying some advanced computing resource to be shared amongst themselves.
In many cases, this is because the resource by its nature itself can only produced in discrete quantities but
can be shared, or it could also be because, although the resource is divisible, it is easier and perhaps more
cost-efficient to sell it in discrete units, where the size of these units is decided on the basis of typical nature
of demand. For example, consider the market for radio spectrum, where the spectrum is sold in the form of
blocks of contiguous frequencies. In the US market, the majority of the current demand for spectrum is for
the purpose of mobile broadband communications, and the blocks are designed with these requirements in
mind (e.g., see the upcoming incentive auctions for repurposing the spectrum used by TV broadcasters for
mobile communications (LTE) [1]). The players in this market are the large cellular service providers like
AT&T, Verizon, T-mobile etc. who compete for several blocks of spectrum in different geographical regions
∗This material is based upon work supported in part by the U.S. Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR) under
grant number MURI FA9550-10-1-0573.
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nationwide. But there is another pool of small interested parties who advocate the allocation of these blocks
for free unlicensed use (e.g. WiFi) as opposed to selling them for exclusive licensed use 1. In a proposal in
[4] that was further analyzed in [5], the authors suggest that groups consisting of smaller content or service
providers who benefit from additional access to spectrum could jointly submit bids for a shared license,
which will compete with bids for exclusive licenses from the bigger firms.
Participating in such a market as a group with the intention of sharing the bought resource entails the
collective decision-making problem of performing aggregate purchasing decisions when the utilities of the
different buyers in the group are privately held. For example, two firms who intend to jointly bid in the
market for radio spectrum have to decide how many blocks to bid for, how much should the bid be and how
to divide the spectrum and the payment in the event that they win any spectrum. Naturally, all of these
decisions have to go hand-in-hand and any scheme that helps them take these joint decisions fairly has to
rely on its ability to elicit the privately known utilities of these agents. The goal of this paper is to design
preference aggregation mechanisms for making such joint purchasing decisions.
We focus on the case where there is a single discrete resource offered for sale in a sealed-bid second price
auction that accepts bids for purchasing the entire resource. Note that this includes the setting where there
is no competition and the seller offers the resource for a fixed price. Further, we assume that the resource
is divisible or shareable and the buyer’s preferences are captured by a utility function that assigns real non-
negative values to different proportions in which resource can be utilized. We will focus on the case where
these utility functions are concave, non-negative and non-decreasing. A group of buyers then needs to decide
what bid is to be submitted to the auction, and how the resource and payment should be divided in the
event that they win the resource.
We present a class of mechanisms called monotonic aggregation mechanisms that enable a group to take these
collective decisions. This mechanism truthfully elicits utility functions from the buyers, prescribes a joint
bid, and prescribes a division of the payment and the resource in the event that they win in the auction. This
mechanism moreover satisfies a popular notion of collusion-resistance known as coalition-strategyproofness
(also called group-strategyproofness in literature). A mechanism is coalition-strategyproof if no coalition of
buyers can find a deviation from truthfulness such that no buyer in the coalition is worse off and at least
one buyer is strictly better off, irrespective of the reports of the buyers not in the coalition.
The most important component of this mechanism is the specification of the resource and payment shares for
different contingencies that may arise in the auction. These shares need to satisfy a ‘monotonicity’ condition
in order for the incentive properties of the mechanism to hold (hence the name). This condition is implicitly
defined with respect to the class of functions that the buyers’ utility functions belong to. We give two explicit
instances of this mechanism that satisfy this condition for the case where these utility functions are concave,
non-negative and non-decreasing.
2 Model: Buying a divisible resource
A set (or group) L of n agents would like to collectively buy a single resource that they intend to share. We
assume that the resource is being sold in a sealed-bid second-price auction with some reserve price ω ≥ 0, in
which the resource is allotted to the highest bidder as long as his bid is higher than ω, at the price equal to
the maximum of the second highest bid and ω 2.
The resource is assumed to be divisible and each agent i in the group has a utility Ui(xi), expressed in
monetary value, for a fraction xi of the resource. We assume that Ui(xi) is the maximum payment that a
buyer is willing to make for the fraction xi of the resource. This utility function Ui : [0, 1] → R+ is known
only to buyer i and the functions {Ui : i ∈ L} are assumed to belong the class C defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. C is the class of concave and non-decreasing functions U : [0, 1]→ R+, such that U(0) = 0.
1It has been argued (see for example [8]) that an open-access unlicensed spectrum can act as an enabler for technological
innovations that would increase social welfare and future tax revenue for the government, while at the same time mitigating
the inefficiencies of exclusive licensed use. But opponents argue that an unlicensed spectrum may cause the government to lose
out on the substantial revenue that it generates by sale to licensed users, which could have also been devoted to social benefit.
2Our results in fact hold for any deterministic dominant strategy truthful auction.
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In order to participate in the auction, the group has to submit a single bid for the resource, and make the
required payment computed by the second-price auction rule in the case that they win. Our goal is to design
a mechanism that accomplishes the following two tasks:
1. Elicit individual utility functions from the agents and then output a group bid to enter into the external
auction.
2. Prescribe a division of the resource and that of the payment needed to be paid in the external auction
amongst the buyers, in the event that they win the resource.
Such a mechanism will be called an aggregation mechanism since it aggregates the preferences of all the
agents in a group to result in a single decision-making entity.
3 Monotonic Aggregation Mechanisms: a structural overview through
examples
We first illustrate the structure of our mechanism with the help of a couple of examples.
Example 3.1. (Buying a resource for a fixed price) Consider a resource A that is being sold for a
fixed price p∗. Suppose the group L that intends to buy the resource consists of three buyers 1, 2 and 3 with
privately known utility functions U1(x) = x, U2(x) =
√
x and U3(x) = ln(1 + x). First, for each subset
A ⊆ L, the mechanism fixes two vectors corresponding to resource shares and payment shares respectively:
(x1(A), · · · , xn(A)) and (y1(A), · · · , yn(A)) such that
∑
i∈A xi(A) =
∑
i∈A yi(A) = 1. These shares satisfy
certain additional conditions that will be defined later. We stress here that these shares are chosen by the
mechanism before it solicits utility reports from the buyers. For now, assume that mechanism chooses,
xi(A) = yi(A) =
1
|A| if i ∈ A and 0 otherwise. This schedule of shares for the different subsets is announced
to the buyers. The mechanism then solicits the utility functions of the buyers within the class C (i.e. the
message space of possible reports is the class C). Let these reported utility functions be G1, G2 and G3. Once
these reports are collected, the mechanism starts by first considering the entire set of buyers S1 = L. Using
the reported utility functions, it determines whether for each buyer i ∈ S1,
p∗yi(S1) ≤ Gi(xi(S1)),
i.e. if p
∗
|S1| ≤ Gi( 1|S1| ). If this condition is satisfied for all the buyers in S1 then it means that according to
the reported utility functions, each buyer i can afford to pay a fraction yi(S1) of the price p
∗ for a fraction
xi(S1) of the resource. The mechanism then buys the resource and both the resource and the price are divided
according amongst the buyers according to the corresponding shares. If the condition is not satisfied for a set
of buyers T1 ⊆ S1, then they are removed to result in a smaller set of buyers S2 = S1 \T1, and the procedure
is repeated until the mechanism either finds a subset of buyers that can together afford to buy the resource
for the corresponding shares, or all the buyers are removed, in which case the resource is not bought. To
illustrate this procedure, assume that the buyers are truthful in their reports, i.e. Gi = Ui and that the price
of the resource is p∗ = 0.9. Then for the set S1 = L = {1, 2, 3}, mechanism checks if
(
0.9
3
,
0.9
3
,
0.3
3
) = (0.3, 0.3, 0.3)
? (1/3, 1√
3
, ln(1 +
1
3
)),
which does not hold since although 13 > 0.3 and
1√
3
∼ 0.57 > 0.3, ln(4/3) ∼ 0.27 < 0.3. Thus the mechanism
removes buyer 3 and considers remaining set of buyers S2 = {1, 2}. It now checks whether
(
0.9
2
,
0.9
2
) = (0.45, 0.45)
? (1/2, 1√
2
),
which holds. Hence the resource is bought and both the resource and the price are split equally between buyers
1 and 2.
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Example 3.2. (Participating in an auction) Consider now the same three buyers with utility functions
U1(x) = x, U2(x) =
√
x and U3(x) = ln(1 + x), but now assume that the resource A is being sold in a
sealed bid second-price auction. In this case also, for each subset A ⊆ L, the mechanism fixes two vectors,
(x1(A), · · · , xn(A)) and (y1(A), · · · , yn(A)), corresponding to resource shares and payment shares respec-
tively. Let us again assume that mechanism chooses, xi(A) = yi(A) =
1
|A| if i ∈ A and 0 otherwise, and this
schedule of shares is announced to the buyers. The mechanism then solicits the utility functions of the buyers
from within the class C. Let G1, G2 and G3 be these reported functions. The mechanism then starts by first
considering the entire set of buyers S1 = L. Using the reported utility functions, it computes the maximum
cumulative payment k such that for each buyer i in S1, kyi(S1) ≤ Gi(xi(S1)). Denote this maximum value
of k as β1. β1 is thus the maximum total payment that the set of buyers S1 can make, such that each buyer in
S1 can afford to buy his share of the resource in that set for the corresponding share of the total payment (i.e.
his payment is less than his utility for his share). To illustrate this operation, suppose that the three buyers
had reported their utility functions truthfully. Then for the set S1 = L = {1, 2, 3}, mechanism computes
β1 = max{k ≥ 0 : (k
3
,
k
3
,
k
3
)  (1/3, 1√
3
, ln(1 +
1
3
))}
= min{1,
√
3, 3 ln(
4
3
)}
= 3 ln(
4
3
) ≈ 0.86.
Now let T1 be the subset of buyers whose utility for their share exactly equals their share of the maximum
payment β1, i.e. the bottleneck buyers. Then the buyers in T1 are removed from the set S1 to result in the
smaller set S2. Thus in this case, buyer 3 is removed from the group to form S2 = {1, 2}. The mechanism
continues with the remaining set S2, finds the corresponding payment β2, and continues so on to find the
rest of the vector β¯ in a similar way until no buyer remains. Thus we have
β2 = max{k ≥ 0 : (k
2
,
k
2
)  (1/2, 1√
2
)}
= min{1,
√
2} = 1.
Here T2 = {1} and hence buyer 1 is removed from S2 to result in S3 = {2}, and we finally have
β3 = max{k ≥ 0 : k ≤ 1} = 1.
Hence the vector β¯ = (0.86, 1, 1). The largest value in this vector is submitted to the auction. If a payment
p∗ is to be made in the auction to win the resource, the mechanism looks for the largest subset Si (i.e. the
one with the smallest index i) that can afford to pay the price, and both the price and the resource is divided
according to the corresponding shares in that subset. Thus in this example β∗ = 1 is submitted as a bid in the
auction. Suppose that there is a single other competing buyer in the auction and suppose that his bid is 0.6.
Thus the minimum payment required to win the auction for the group is 0.6. Now r = min{i : βi ≥ 0.6} = 1.
Thus the entire group, i.e. S1 = L is allotted equal shares of the resource and each buyer pays 0.2 (
0.6
3 ) to
the seller. Suppose instead that the other buyer in the auction submitted a bid of 0.9. Then in that case
r = min{i : βi ≥ 0.9} = 2. Thus the group S2 = {1, 2} is allotted equal shares of the resource, while buyer
3 does not get any share of the resource. Both the winning buyers pay 0.45 to the seller. Thus in short,
the resource is shared between the largest subset of buyers who can jointly afford to pay the price, divided
according to the prescribed shares for that subset.
These two examples are an instance of a class of mechanisms that are obtained by varying the resource
and payment shares for the different subsets of buyers. In our main result in this paper, we show that if
these shares are chosen in a way that they satisfy a certain monotonicity property in relation to the class of
functions C, then the mechanism is truthful and moreover, it is coalition-strategyproof.
Definition 3.1. (Coalition-strategyproofness) An aggregation mechanism is coalition-strategyproof if
for any coalition of buyers S ⊆ L, fixing any feasible utility function reports of all buyers not in S, for every
feasible deviation of the buyers in S from truthful reporting, either all the buyers are indifferent between the
original outcome and the new resulting outcome or at least one buyer is strictly worse off.
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We then give explicit characterizations of sharing schedules that satisfy this property.
4 Related work
Our model is related to the problem of sharing the cost of a jointly utilized resource, which has a rich history
in the economics literature. The typical model adapted to our setting is as follows (see [3, 9]. Given n agents
with demands qi, the total cost for utilizing the resource is a function C(q1, · · · , qn). The problem is to
define a division of this cost amongst the agents.
There are two angles from which this problem has traditionally been approached. One is the normative
approach which looks at the problem from the point of view of fairness, where the goal is to characterize
the set of sharing rules that satisfy certain desirable axiomatic properties. The seminal work in this setting
is the Shapley value sharing rule [15], which considers the specific case of binary demand i.e. qi can either
be 0 or 1, which can be interpreted as an agent participating or not. For a fixed order of the agents, each
agent has a marginal cost for his participation in that order. Shapley value assigns to an agent the average
marginal cost over all the possible n! orders. This can be interpreted as each agent being charged the uniform
average of the line integral of his marginal cost of participation along paths from (0, 0, · · · , 0) to (1, 1, · · · , 1)
that traverse along the edges of the hypercube. This rule is extended to the case of variable demands by
the Shapley-Shubik rule [16]: each agent is charged the uniform average of the line integral of his marginal
cost of consumption along paths from (0, 0, · · · , 0) to (q1, q2, · · · , q3) that traverse along the edges of the
hypercuboid. The third popular rule is the Aumann-Shapley rule [3, 2], that charges each agent the integral
of his marginal costs along the diagonal path from (0, 0, · · · , 0) to (q1, q2, · · · , q3). Finally, the serial sharing
rule [13, 6] arranges the demands in an increasing order so that q1 ≤ q2 ≤ · · · ≤ qn, and charges each
agent the integral of his marginal costs along the path made up of line segments connecting (0, 0, · · · , 0) to
(q1, q1, · · · , q1) to (q1, q2, · · · , q2) and so on to (q1, q2, · · · , qn). Several axiomatizations have been proposed
that characterize these ‘additive’ rules, i.e. rules that act as linear operators on the cost structure, see
[18, 11, 6]. Many non-additive rules have also been considered and axiomatized, see e.g. [17, 14, 7].
The other approach, which is the one taken in this paper, brings incentives into focus. Here agents are
assumed to be endowed with preferences over their consumption of the resource and the cost that they have
to pay. Given a cost function and a cost-sharing rule, the agents play the ‘demand-game’ where each player
reports a demand and is charged according to the sharing rule. The problem is to characterize cost-sharing
rules result in ‘demand games’ that satisfy nice equilibrium properties. The seminal work on this approach
[12] has focused on incremental cost sharing methods, which for a reported vector of demands (q1, q2, · · · , qn)
charge each agent the integral of his marginal costs along some path from (0, 0, · · · , 0) to (q1, q2, · · · , qn). As
discussed earlier, examples of such rules are the serial cost sharing rule and the Aumann-Shapley rule. The
incentive properties of these mechanisms crucially depend on the shape of the cost function. For the case
of integral demands (qis are integers) and convex preferences, it has been shown that if the cost function
has increasing marginal returns and supermodular (∂iiC > 0 and ∂ijC > 0) then the incremental cost
sharing mechanisms result in a demand game with a unique strong Nash-equilibrium welfare3 (i.e. the
strong equilibrium is unique or if there are multiple such equilibria, then they are welfare equivalent). In the
case where the cost function is submodular with decreasing marginal returns (∂iiC < 0 and ∂ijC < 0), only
those incremental rules that integrate along paths from (0, 0, · · · , 0) to (q1, q2, · · · , qn) along the edges of the
hypercuboid, called the sequential standalone mechanisms result in a demand game with this nice property.
This result for submodular cost functions bears an important qualification: if the demands are binary, then
any cost sharing scheme that satisfies a cross-monotonicity property results in a demand game with these
desirable properties (see also [10] for an independent study of this case).
One can also look at these results from an implementation theory perspective: a social choice function maps
the reported preferences of agents to an assignment of consumption levels for the agents and a division of the
corresponding total cost. The goal is to characterize social choice functions that result in truthful reporting of
preferences a ‘nice’ equilibrium. For the two polar classes of cost functions, the respective incremental sharing
mechanisms (or the cross-monotonic sharing mechanisms for the case of binary demands and submodular
costs) result in a social choice function that is truthful and moreover coalition-strategyproof. Of particular
3A strong equilibrium is defined as a strategic profile for which no subset of players has a joint deviation that strictly benefits
all of them, while all other players are expected to maintain their equilibrium strategies.
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interest in literature is the case of additive cost functions, where C(q1, · · · , qn) = C(q1 + q2 + · · · ,+qn), and
our focus in this paper is on cost functions of this form. In this case the supermodularity or submodularity
conditions translate to the convexity and concavity respectively of the function C.
The general problem of interest in our paper is designing sharing rules in the case where the cost is assigned
to integral quantities of the resource, while the demand is continuous, resulting in a cost function of the
form:
C(q1, q2, · · · , qn) =
{ ∑dq1+··· ,+qne
i=1 ai if q1 + · · · ,+qn > 0;
0 otherwise.
(1)
where dqe is the smallest integer i such that i ≥ q and (a1, a2, · · · ) is the sequence of non-negative marginal
cost for consuming each additional quantity of the resource. We look at the problem from the point of view of
incentives and we take the implementation theoretic approach of truthfully eliciting preferences of the agents
by proposing incentive-compatible resource and cost allocations, rather than designing a demand game by
choosing a cost sharing rule. If the demands are restricted to be integral and if the sequence (a1, a2, · · · ) is
either non-increasing or non-decreasing, then the incremental cost sharing schemes discussed earlier result
in coalition-strategyproof social choice functions. But this is not true if the demands are continuous. Our
mechanism is a step towards bridging this gap for the specific case of unit supply, which can be encoded in
a cost function of the form:
C(q1, q2, · · · , qn) =
 0 if q1 + · · · ,+qn = 0;p∗ if 0 < q1 + · · · ,+qn ≤ 1;∞ if q1 + · · · ,+qn > 1. (2)
Finally, the general setting where the group of buyers jointly bid for the resource in an external auction, i.e.
where the price p∗ is extraneously defined has not been considered before.
5 Definition and main results
In this section we first give a formal definition of the mechanism and then prove some of its properties. Let
C be a subset of the class of utility functions U : [0, 1]→ R+ that satisfy U(0) = 0.
Monotonic aggregation mechanism for the class of utility functions C :
For each subset A ⊆ L, fix two tuples of n non-negative numbers (x1(A), · · · , xn(A)) and (y1(A), · · · , yn(A)),
corresponding to the resource shares and the payment shares respectively, such that the following three
conditions are satisfied:
1.
∑n
i=1 xi(A) = 1 and xi(A) > 0 only if i ∈ A.
2.
∑n
i=1 yi(A) = 1 and yi(A) > 0 only if i ∈ A.
3. (monotonicity) For any C > 0, for any two subsets A and B such that A ⊆ B, and for any i ∈ A, if
Ui(xi(B)) < Cyi(B)
then
Ui(xi(A)) < Cyi(A)
for every Ui ∈ C.
The mechanism solicits utility function reports Gi ∈ C from all the agents and computes a vector of values
β¯ = (β1, β2, · · · , βm)
corresponding to diminishing subsets of agents S1 ⊃ S2 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Sm as follows.
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• Let S1 = L. For each subset Sj , define
βj = max{k ≥ 0 : (ky1(Sj), ky2(Sj), · · · , kyn(Sj))
 (G1(x1(Sj)), · · · , Gn(xn(Sj)))} (3)
where  denotes a component-wise ≤ inequality.
• Let Tj be the set of agents with positive payment shares who force the inequality in the definition
above, i.e. all agents i ∈ Sj such that yi(Sj) > 0 and βjyi(Sj) = Gi(xi(Sj)). Then Sj+1 = Sj \ Tj and
m is the smallest integer such that Sm+1 = φ.
• Let β∗ = max{β1, · · · , βm}. The mechanism submits the bid β∗ to the auction.
• Suppose the group wins the auction and has to make a payment p∗ ≤ β∗ . Let r = min{i : βi ≥ p∗}.
Then each agent i pays yi(Sr)p
∗ and gets a fraction xi(Sr).
Sr will be called the winning set of buyers. The key requirement of the mechanism is that the sharing
schedule should satisfy the implicitly defined monotonicity condition with respect to the class C. It says that
if a buyer in a set cannot afford to pay his share of some price C for his share of the resource in that set,
then she should not be able to do so in any subset of that set, so long as his utility function is in C. Another
way to state this requirement is to have
Ui(xi(B))
yi(B)
≥ Ui(xi(A))
yi(A)
if A ⊂ B for any i ∈ A and for all U ∈ C. This means that the average utility per unit payment decreases
for a buyer as the size of the subset decreases. In the next section we will give explicit sharing schedules
that satisfy the monotonicity condition with respect to the class C.
Also note that since the utility function report of a buyer is only evaluated at the possible resource shares
corresponding to the different subsets that he is in, the entire function need not be elicited. The mechanism
only needs to solicit the utilities of the buyers for the different shares he may receive. This corresponds to
an elicitation of 2n−1 + 1 values in the worst case for each buyer, but can be much lower depending on the
choice of these shares. In the examples that we considered, the resource share of each buyer corresponding
to a set A is 1|A| if this buyer is in A. For this choice of shares, only n utility values corresponding to the
shares { 1i ; i = 1, · · · , n} are needed to be reported. The mechanism nevertheless needs to ensure that the
values for the different shares are samples of some function in C. In order to ensure this, it is sufficient to
check that the piecewise linear extrapolation of the reported values that results in a function on [0, 1] is in
C, i.e. it is concave and non-decreasing.
Following is our main result.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose that the resource is being sold in a sealed-bid second price auction with a reserve
price. Also, assume that a buyer strictly prefers the outcome where he obtains a non-zero fraction of the re-
source with a payment equal to his utility for that fraction of the resource, to the outcome where he does not ob-
tain anything and makes no payment. Then any monotonic aggregation mechanism is coalition-strategyproof.
The mechanism thus truthfully elicits individual preferences and then aggregates them to result in a single
joint decision-making entity. In order to prove this theorem, we formalize a few ideas.
In a second price auction with a reserve price, there is a minimum price needed to be paid by an agent to
win the resource, which is the maximum of the reserve price and the highest bid of all the other agents. For
our group of buyers, let this price be p∗. For two different sets of reports of the utility functions by the
buyers in the group, we say that outcome of the auction remains the same if the same set of buyers W ⊆ L
is the winning set. Since the resource and payment shares depend only on the set of winning buyers, these
shares in the two outcomes are the same for all the buyers. Consider a coalition of buyers C ⊆ L. Assume
that the reports of the utility functions of all the other buyers are fixed. Suppose that if all the agents in
C report their utilities truthfully (keeping all other reports fixed), then the vector of values generated is
β¯0 = (β01 , β
0
2 , · · · , β0m) and let the winning set of buyers be W 0 (which may be empty). Also let C be the set
of agents in C who are in W 0 and let C ′ = C \ C. We first prove the following lemma.
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Lemma 5.1. 1. Suppose that starting from a set of buyers S, under a fixed report from all the buyers,
the set of winning buyers is some set W ⊆ S (which may be empty). Then starting from a set of buyers
S \M where M ⊆ S \W , under the same reports, the set of winning buyers is also W .
2. Suppose that starting from a set of buyers S, under a fixed report from all the buyers, the set of winning
buyers is some set W ⊆ S. Then starting from a set of buyers S \ {i} where i ∈W , the set of winning
buyers W ′ satisfies W ′ ⊆ G \ {i}.
Proof. We first prove the first claim. First, we can easily show that W is a subset of the new set of winning
buyers W ′. This is because, if any buyer i in W claims to be able to afford to pay yi(W )p∗ for xi(W )
fraction of the resource, he can also pay yi(W ∪Q)p∗ for xi(W ∪Q) fraction of the resource. This is because,
by the converse implication of the monotonicity assumption, we have that if Gi(xi(W )) ≥ Cyi(W ) then
Gi(xi(W ∪Q)) ≥ Cyi(W ∪Q) for every i and every Gi ∈ C.
Thus we just need to prove that Q = W ′ \W is empty. Suppose not. Then there is some buyer i ∈ Q
who in the original case was removed from the set of buyers S′ ⊆ S where (W ∪ Q) ⊆ S′. This in
particular implies that Gi(xi(S
′)) < p∗yi(S′). But this again implies, by the monotonicity assumption that
Gi(xi(W ∪Q)) < p∗yi(W ∪Q). This contradicts the assumption that i is in the new winning set. Thus Q
has to be empty. For the second claim, we just need to prove that Q = W ′ \ (W \{i}) is empty, which agains
follows from a similar argument.
Now suppose for some fixed reports of all buyers, the vector of values computed by the mechanism is β¯. Now
the the effect of any deviation from these fixed reports by a coalition C, manifests itself for the first time
by a change in some βk corresponding to some subset Sk, to a new value β
′
k. If β
′
k < βk then this change
has been effectively implemented by one buyer i in coalition C by under-reporting. If β′k > βk, then there
must be at least one buyer i in the coalition C who was forcing the constraint in the set Sk under truthful
reporting, i.e. Gi(xi(Sk)) = βkyi(Sk) and who over-reports. In either case, we say that such a buyer in C
is responsible for causing this first change. Knowing this, we decompose the deviation by coalition C into a
sequence of deviations by individual agents that sequentially bring out the transformation:
β¯0 → β¯1 → β¯2 → · · · β¯N .
This sequence is constructed in the following way. First, β¯0 is the vector of values computed under truthful
reports from all agents in C and certain assumed fixed reports of the other buyers. The individual agent
in C whose non-truthful report brings out the first change in β¯0 is denoted by i1. Next β¯
1 is the vector of
values computed under truthful reports by all the buyers in C \ i1, the non-truthful report of agent i1 and
under the assumed fixed reports of the other buyers. Then recursively, we denote ij to be the individual
agent in C whose non-truthful report brings out the first change in β¯j−1. Then define β¯j to be the vector
of values computed under truthful reports by all the buyers in C \ {i0, i1, · · · , ij}, the non-truthful report
of agents {i0, i1, · · · , ij} and under the assumed fixed reports of the other buyers. Finally β¯n is the vector
of values computed using the deviated reports of all the agents in C (note that not all agents in C are
necessarily non-truthful) and the assumed fixed reports of the other buyers. With each β¯j = (βj1, · · · , βjmj ),
are the associated subsets {Sj1, · · · , Sjmj} encountered by the mechanism. Further denote W j = Sjrj to be
the winning set of buyers corresponding to β¯j , where rj = min{i : βji ≥ p∗}. We first prove the following.
Lemma 5.2. For j ∈ {1, · · · , n}, if ij /∈ W j−1 then either W j = W j−1 or W j = W j−1 ∪M ∪ {ij}, where
M ∩W j−1 = φ and ij makes a strict loss being in W j.
Proof. Let k be the smallest index at which β¯j differs from β¯j−1. Note that Sj−1k = S
j
k. Now if agent ij
changes the value of βj−1k to β
j
k < β
j−1
k , then he forces the constraint to have Gij (xij (S
j
k)) = β
1
kyij (S
j
k).
Since ij is not in the winning set of buyers under β¯
j−1, βj−1k < p
∗ and thus βjk < p
∗. Thus agent ij is
removed from the group and the remaining set of buyers is Sjk \ ij . By the first claim in lemma 5.1, the
set of winning buyers is again W j−1. Next, assume that the agent ij ’s report changes the value of β
j−1
k
to βjk > β
j−1
k . This implies that ij was forcing the constraint under truthful reporting in step j − 1, i.e.
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Uij (xij (S
j−1
k )) = β
j−1
k yij (S
j−1
k ) < p
∗yij (S
j−1
k ). Now if β
j
k ≥ p∗, then the resource is allotted to the group
Sj−1k = S
j
k and thus agent ij is a part of the new group of winning buyers W
j , resulting in a strict loss
p∗yij (S
j
k)−Uij (xij (Sjk) > 0 for him. Thus W j = W j−1 ∪M ∪ ij where M ∩W j−1 = φ and ij makes a strict
loss being in W j .
Next if βjk < p
∗, then in the case that ij is forcing the constraint by his report, i.e. Gij (xij (S
j
k)) = β
j
kyij (S
j
k),
he is still removed from the set of buyers and by the first claim in lemma 5.1, the set of winning buyers is again
W j−1. In the case that ij does not force the constraint by his report, i.e. Gij (xij (S
j
k)) > β
j
kyij (S
j
k), it follows
that some other buyer m was removed from the set of buyers. It cannot be one of the buyers in W j−1, since
if ym(W
j−1)p∗ ≤ Gm(xm(W j−1)), by the converse implication of monotonicity, ym(Sjk)p∗ ≤ Gm(xm(Sjk))
also and thus, since βjk < p
∗, we have that ym(S
j
k)β
j
k ≤ Gm(xm(Sjk)). Thus the agent m is in Sjk \W j−1 ∪ ij .
Now with the new β¯j computed, either ij is in the winning set of buyers, in which case he makes a strict loss
since if p∗yij (S
j
k) > Uij (xij (S
j
k)), then he cannot afford to pay p
∗yij (S
j
r) > Uij (xij (S
j
r)), for any S
j
r ⊂ Sjk.
Also W j−1 has to be in the winning set again by the converse implication of the monotonicity assumption.
Thus the claim holds true. Or he is not in the winning set of buyers. In that case suppose he was removed
from some set Sjq at some stage q by the mechanism. Then note that since S
j
q is not the winning set, the
entire set W j−1 is has to be in the set of active buyers Sjq+1, again because of the converse implication of
the monotonicity assumption. Thus after stage q, the set of remaining buyers is Sjq+1 = W
j−1 ∪Q for some
Q ⊆ Sjk \W j−1 (which may be empty). Thus by the first claim in lemma 5.1, the the set of winning buyers
is again W j−1. Thus again the claim holds true.
Lemma 5.3. For each j at least one of the following holds.
1. W j = W 0.
2. (W 0 \W j) ∩ C 6= φ.
3. W j ∩ C 6= φ and at least one i ∈W j ∩ C makes a strict loss being in W j.
Proof. We will prove this lemma using induction. The claim clearly holds for j = 0. Now we assume that
at least one of the following hypotheses hold true for step j − 1 for some j ≥ 2:
1. W j−1 = W 0.
2. (W 0 \W j−1) ∩ C 6= φ.
3. W j−1 ∩ C 6= φ and at least one i ∈W j ∩ C makes a strict loss being in W j .
If the agent ij /∈ W j−1, then the previous lemma says that either W j = W j−1 or W j = W j−1 ∪M ′ ∪ {ij}
where M ′ ∩W j−1 = φ and ij makes a strict loss. Since ij ∈ C, in any case at least one of the hypotheses
holds true for step j.
Next, suppose that the agent ij is in W
j−1. Suppose that the first change in the vector β¯j−1 happens at
index k and the changed value βjk is such that β
j
k > β
j−1
k . This means that ij was forcing the constraint under
truthful reporting in step j − 1, and since he is amongst the winning set of buyers W j−1, this means that
Sj−1k is that winning set and still remains so under β¯
j . Hence W j = W j−1 and thus one of the hypotheses
is true for step j.
Now suppose that βjk < β
j−1
k . Then either β
j
k ≥ p∗, in which case βj−1k ≥ p∗ also and Sj−1k was and still
remains the winning set of buyers, which again implies that one of the hypotheses is true for step j. Or
βjk < p
∗, in which case agent ij is removed from the subset. Now from the second claim of lemma 5.1, the
set of winning buyers satisfies W j ⊆ W j−1 \ {ij}. In the case that W j−1 = W 0 note that ij ∈ C and thus
W j ⊆ W 0 \ {ij} implies that the second hypothesis is true. In the case that (W 0 \W j−1) ∩ C 6= φ, again
the second hypothesis is true.
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In the case that W j−1 ∩ C 6= φ and at least one i ∈ W j ∩ C makes a strict loss being in W j , suppose that
W j−1 = A ∪M where A ⊆ W 0 and M ∩W 0 = φ. Then we have that W j = A′ ∪M ′ where A′ ⊆ A \ {ij}
and M ′ ⊆M \ {ij} and M ′ ∩W 0 = φ. Now if ij ∈ A then the second hypothesis is true. Suppose then that
ij ∈M .
Now each buyer i in M ′ is one of two types:
1. Type A: i ∈ L \ C.
2. Type B: i ∈ {i1, · · · , in} \ {ij}.
Now since M ′ is disjoint from W 0, there must be a buyer m ∈ M ′ who at step 0 was removed from some
set of buyers S′ such that W 0 ∪M ′ ⊆ S′. This in particular implies that Gm(xm(S′)) < p∗ym(S′). But
this again implies, by the monotonicity assumption that Gm(xm(A
′ ∪M ′)) < p∗ym(A′ ∪M ′). Now if this
buyer m is of type A, then his report at step j is the same as his report at step 0, which is Gm. And thus
this contradicts the assumption that m is in the new winning set W j . Thus the buyer m ∈ M who at step
0 was removed from the set of buyers S′, such that W 0 ∪M ⊆ S′, has to be of type B. But such a buyer
m’s report at step 0 is truthful. Thus this implies that Um(xm(S
′)) < p∗ym(S′). Thus by the monotonicity
assumption, Um(xm(A
′ ∪M ′)) < p∗ym(A′ ∪M ′) and thus he makes a strict loss being in W j . Thus either
there is at least one buyer in M ′ who faces a strict loss being in W j and he is in C (since a buyer of type B
is in C) or M ′ = φ. In the prior case at least one of the hypotheses holds for step j.
Consider the latter case where M ′ = φ. Suppose that A′ ⊆ A ⊂ W 0. Then there must be a buyer
m ∈ W 0 \ A′ who at step j, was removed from the set of buyers S˜ such that W 0 ⊆ S˜. This in particular
implies that Gm(xm(S
′)) < p∗ym(S′) where Gm is this buyer’s report at step j. But this again implies, by
the monotonicity assumption that Gm(xm(W
0)) < p∗ym(W 0). Now if this buyer m is of type A, then his
report at step 0 is the same as his report at step j, which is Gm. And thus this contradicts the assumption
that m was in the winning set W 0. Hence m must be of type B and since m ∈ W 0, he also must be in C.
And thus either (W 0 \A′ ∩ C) 6= φ or A′ = A = W 0. Hence again one of the hypotheses holds true.
Proof of theorem 5.2: Lemma 5.3 shows that that one of the following holds true:
1. WN = W 0.
2. (W 0 \WN ) ∩ C 6= φ.
3. WN ∩ C 6= φ and at least one i ∈WN ∩ C makes a strict loss being in WN .
In the first case, the deviation by the coalition C has no effect on the outcome of the auction. In the second
case, there is at least one buyer in C that was in the winning set under truthful reporting and is not because
of the deviation. Since any buyer strictly prefers winning, even if it is under a zero net profit, over not
winning anything, such a deviation is not supported by such a buyer. In the third case, there is a buyer in C
that makes a strict loss by deviation and hence again this buyer would not support such a deviation. Hence
the mechanism is coalition-strategyproof.
There is an implicit assumption in our model that the buyers are individually ‘small’, in the sense that they
are not expected to be able to pay for the entire resource on their own, i.e. Ui(1) is small as compared
to the typical highest bid of the other agents (or the reserve price). This justifies the assumption that if a
buyer is excluded by the mechanism from participating in sharing the resource, he cannot compete against
the group on his own for the entire resource, or that he is willing to participate in the mechanism since his
‘outside option’ has no value. But nevertheless, it is interesting to see what the mechanism has to offer to a
buyer who could have potentially purchased the entire resource for himself. We define the following notion
of ‘individual consistency’ of an aggregation mechanism.
Definition 5.1. (Individual consistency) Consider the set of buyers W that would have individually been
willing to purchase the entire resource for the price p∗ offered in the external auction, i.e. for all i ∈ W ,
Ui(1) > p
∗. Then the aggregation mechanism is said to be individually consistent if W 6= φ implies that the
group ends up purchasing the resource.
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We then have the following result.
Theorem 5.2. Any monotonic aggregation mechanism with fixed shares is individually consistent. Further
if W is the set of buyers for whom Ui(1) > p
∗, then all the buyers in W are in the winning set of buyers Sr.
Proof. Suppose there is a buyer i for whom Ui(1) ≥ p∗. From the definition of the resource and payment
shares, xi({i}) = yi({i}) = 1 and thus this inequality is the same as Ui(xi({i})) ≥ yi({i})p∗. But the
monotonicity condition conversely implies that if
Ui(xi({i})) ≥ yi({i})p∗,
then
Ui(xi(B)) ≥ yi(B)p∗ (4)
for any B such that i ∈ B. Now i ∈ S1 = L and further (4) implies that i /∈ Tj for any Sj such that the
corresponding βj < p
∗. Further Ui(xi({i})) ≥ yi({i})p∗ implies that there is some j∗ such that βj∗ ≥ p∗ and
βj < p
∗ for all j < j∗ and further {i} ∈ Sj∗ . Thus the resource is bought in the outcome of the mechanism.
This argument is valid for every buyer i ∈W . Thus each buyer in W is in the winning set of buyers.
Note that the mechanism guarantees that the entire set W is in the winning set of buyers Sr. But the share
of the resource for a buyer in W in the winning set could be 0 (and hence the payment is also 0). This can
be easily avoided by choosing resource shares that satisfy xi(A) > 0 for all i ∈ A, for every A ∈ L.
6 Explicit Characterizations
In this section we give explicit sharing schedules that satisfy the monotonicity condition with respect to class
C. For the first kind consider the following schedule of shares:
Cross-monotonic sharing schedule for the class of utility functions C (CMSS)
For each subset A ⊆ L, fix n non-negative numbers (x1(A), · · · , xn(A)) which are the resource as well as the
payment shares, such that they satisfy
1.
∑n
i=1 xi(A) = 1 and xi(A) > 0 only if i ∈ A.
2. (Cross-monotonicity) If A ⊆ B, then xi(A) ≥ xi(B) for all i ∈ A.
Thus in the cross-monotonic sharing schedule, the payment shares and the resource shares are equal for each
subset of buyers, and these shares satisfy the property of cross-monotonicity. We can then show that this
choice of shares also satisfies the monotonicity requirement with respect to the class C.
Theorem 6.1. The choice of resource and payment shares in the cross-monotonic sharing schedule satisfies
the monotonicity condition with respect to the class C.
Proof. By the property of any concave function U ∈ C, if U(x) < Cx for some C > 0 and some x ∈ [0, 1],
then U(x′) < Cx′ for any x ≥ x′ (see figure). Then the result follows from the cross-monotonicity of the
shares.
In order to define the next class of mechanisms, we define the following property.
Definition 6.1. (Single crossing property) A function f : [0, 1] → R+ is said to satisfy the single crossing
property with respect to a class of functions K if for every C > 0 and every U ∈ K, if Cf(x) > U(x) for
some x ∈ [0, 1], then Cf(x′) > U(x′) for any x′ > x.
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Figure 1: The single crossing property of linear functions with respect to concave functions: if U(x1) < Cx1
for some C > 0 and some x1 ∈ [0, 1], then U(x2) < Cx2 for any x2 ≥ x1
Note that a function f(x) satisfies the single crossing property with a class of functions K, if and only if any
function Cf(x) for C > 0 also satisfies this property. We saw that the primary reason why equal payment
and resource shares satisfy the monotonicity condition when these shares are cross-monotonic, is that the
function f(x) = x satisfies the single crossing property with respect to the class of utility functions C. Utiliz-
ing this property, we can provide another explicit characterization of the monotonic aggregation mechanism.
Ranked resource allocation schedule (RRAS)
Suppose that C˜ is a subset of the class C and a concave function f : [0, 1]→ R+ satisfies the single crossing
property with respect to this class. Then consider the following choice of shares in a monotonic aggregation
mechanism:
• Resource shares:
– Fix a ranked ordering of the buyers {1, · · · , n}. Fix an initial set of resource shares (x1(L), · · · , xn(L))
corresponding to set L satisfying∑n
i=1 xi(L) = 1.
– For each subset A ⊂ L, the rank ordered vector of resource shares of buyers in A is defined to be
(xj1(A), · · · , xjl(A)) = ((1−
l∑
r=2
xjr (L)), xj2(L), · · · , xjl(L)).
• Payment shares:
– For the payment shares, for each subset A ⊂ L and buyer i, define
yi(A) =
f(xi(A))∑
j∈A f(xj(A))
The resource-sharing scheme of this schedule has the following interpretation. When a set of buyers dimin-
ishes to a smaller subset in the monotonic aggregation mechanism, the shares of the buyers that are removed
are allocated to the buyer with the highest rank in the subset. Once the shares of the buyers in the largest
set L is fixed, this rule determines the shares corresponding to all of its subsets. The payment shares in any
subset are defined to be proportional to the values of the function f evaluated at the corresponding resource
shares. We can again show that under the assumptions on the properties satisfied by f , this sharing schedule
satisfies the monotonicity condition.
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Theorem 6.2. The choice of resource and payment shares in the ranked resource allocation schedule satisfies
the monotonicity condition with respect to the class C˜.
Proof. We need to show that for any C > 0, for any two subsets A and B such that A ⊆ B, and for any
i ∈ A, if Ui(xi(B)) < C f(xi(B))∑
i∈B f(xj(B))
then Ui(xi(A)) < C
f(xi(A))∑
j∈A f(xj(A))
for every Ui ∈ C. Now, the choice of
the resource shares is such that xi(A) ≥ xi(B) and so from the single crossing property of the function f ,
we have that
Ui(xi(A)) < C
f(xi(A))∑
j∈B f(xj(B))
for every Ui ∈ C˜.
Thus we need to show that
∑
j∈B f(xj(B)) ≥
∑
j∈A f(xj(A)). Let i
∗ be the highest ranked buyer in the set
A and let (xj1(b), · · · , xj|B\A|) be the ordered vector of shares of buyers in B \ A. Then from the definition
of the resource shares, since the shares of the buyers in A \ i∗ are the same in the sets A and B and since in
A, i∗ gets the all the shares of the buyers in B \A, we have that
∑
j∈B
f(xj(B))−
∑
j∈A
f(xj(A)) =
|B\A|∑
r=1
f(xjr ) + f(xi∗)− f(
|B\A|∑
r=1
xjr + xi∗)
=
|B\A|∑
r=1
(
f(xjr )− f(0)
)
−
(
f(
r−1∑
l=1
xjl + xi∗ + xjr )− f(
r−1∑
l=1
xjl + xi∗)
)
+ f(0)
≥
|B\A|∑
r=1
f(0) ≥ 0.
The first inequality holds since f is concave and the shares are non-negative, and the second holds since f
is non-negative.
Note that the resource shares in the RRAS mechanism are cross-monotonic. Thus we can naturally compare
this mechanism to the CMSS with the same resource shares.
Example 6.1. Consider the class of utility functions
C˜ = {g(x) = cxk : c ≥ 0, k ∈ [0, 1
2
]}.
One can easily show that the function f(x) =
√
x satisfies the single crossing property with respect to this
class. Consider three buyers 1, 2 and 3 with utility functions U1(x) = x
1
4 , U2(x) = x
1
3 and U3(x) =
√
x
respectively. Suppose that the priority order of the buyers is {1, 2, 3}. Let the resource shares corresponding
to the entire set of the buyers be ( 12 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ). This determines the resource and payment shares for all the
subsets, as described in the priority based aggregation mechanism. The following table shows these shares
for the three buyers. The last two columns show the sequence of {βj} computed using the RRAS shares and
the CMSS shares (in which the payment shares are the same as the resource shares) respectively. The {βj}
are only computed for the sets {Sj} that are encountered in the mechanism. Thus as shown in the table,
for the RRAS shares, S1 = {1, 2, 3}, S2 = {1, 2} and S3 = {2} while for the CMSS shares, S1 = {1, 2, 3},
S2 = {2, 3} and S3 = {3}. Note that the ordered vector of β values computed in RRAS mechanism dominates
the vector of values computed in the CMSS mechanism .
7 Conclusion
We designed a class of preference aggregation mechanisms that we call monotonic aggregation mechanisms
that enable a group of agents with private utilities to make purchasing decisions for a shared resource.
The key properties of the mechanism are coalition-strategyproofness, individual consistency and the ability
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Subsets Resource shares RRAS Payment shares RRAS {βj} CMSS {βj}
{1, 2, 3} ( 12 , 14 , 14 ) ( 11+√2 , 12+√2 , 12+√2 ) 1.707 1.68
{1, 2} ( 34 , 14 , 0) (
√
3
1+
√
3
, 1
1+
√
3
, 0) 1.467 -
{2, 3} (0, 34 , 14 ) (0,
√
3
1+
√
3
, 1
1+
√
3
) - 1.21
{1, 3} ( 34 , 0, 14 ) (
√
3
1+
√
3
, 0, 1
1+
√
3
) - -
{1} (1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0) - -
{2} (0, 1, 0) (0, 1, 0) 1 -
{3} (0, 0, 1) (0, 0, 1) - 1
to exactly recover the price of the resource in the market. We gave two explicit characterizations of this
mechanism for the case where the utility functions of the buyers are concave and non-decreasing. Apart
from these characterizations, one may find other explicit characterizations of the monotonic aggregation
mechanism for specific classes of utility functions. Generalized techniques of designing resource and payment
sharing schemes that satisfy the monotonicity condition for broad classes of utility functions would be very
useful. The monotonic aggregation mechanism is not efficient. It may be the case that the group of agents
may jointly be able to pay for the resource with some payment and resource division, but the mechanism
leads to an outcome in which they do not buy the resource. Although, this efficiency loss is unavoidable in
mechanisms that satisfy participation constraints and require an exact recovery of the fixed cost, an insight
into the worst-case welfare properties of our mechanism would be very helpful.
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